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1 Exxon Shipping Co v Baker, 128 S Ct 2605 (2008).
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker is a landmark that establishes an upper bound ratio 
of punitive damages to compensatory damages of 1:1 for 
maritime cases, with potential implications for other types 
of cases as well. This article critiques the Court’s reliance 
on the median ratio of punitive to compensatory damages 
in samples of verdicts to set an upper bound for punitive 
damages awards. Our critique of the approach draws on the 
properties of statistical distributions and a new analysis of 
cases with punitive damages awards. The Court’s conclusion 
that a 1:1 ratio establishes a fair upper bound lacks a sound 
scientifi c basis.
I .  T H E  U . S .  S U P R E M E  C O U R T  D E C I S I O N  I N 
E X X O N  S H I P P I N G  C O .  V.  B A K E R 1
The 2008 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker 
is a landmark both with respect to the setting of punitive damages 
amounts and with respect to the use of statistical analysis of punitive 
damages awards to establish guidelines for punitive damages. The 
thrust of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker is to reduce the punitive damages award for In re the Exxon 
Valdez so that there will be a maximum 1:1 ratio of punitive damages 
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2 The compensatory damages reference point used by the U.S. Supreme Court 
is $507.5 million rather than the original $287 million verdict because the Court 
accepted the District Court’s calculation of the total compensatory damages. See id at 
2605, 2622. The District Court included in the compensatory damages tally the $287 
million Phase II jury verdict as well as twenty other court awards and settlements to 
Seattle fi sh processors, Native class members, Native corporations, municipalities 
and villages, and other groups harmed by the spill. See In re the Exxon Valdez, 236 F 
Supp 2d 1043, 1058- 60 (D Alaska 2002).
3 Exxon Shipping Co, 128 S Ct at 2622.
to compensatory damages in this case. The fi nancial implications are 
substantial, as the original 1994 jury award made in the case In re the 
Exxon Valdez consists of $287 million in compensatory damages and 
$5.0 billion in punitive damages.2
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker indicates a far lower upper bound 
ratio than was recommended by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 2003 
decision in State Farm v. Campbell. As the Court reviews the impli-
cations of the previous decision, it observes: “In State Farm, we said 
that a single- digit maximum is appropriate in all but the most ex-
ceptional cases, and ‘[w]hen compensatory damages are substantial, 
then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can 
reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.’ (538 U.S., 
at 425.).”3
The potential ramifi cations of the 2008 decision in Exxon Ship-
ping Co. v. Baker may be far reaching, and the 1:1 upper limit guide-
line ultimately may not be restricted to maritime shipping cases 
such as this. As Justice Ginsburg observes in her opinion: “In the 
end, is the Court holding only that 1:1 is the maritime- law ceiling, 
or is it also signaling that any ratio higher than 1:1 will be held to 
exceed ‘the constitutional outer limit’? . . . . On next opportunity, 
will the Court rule, defi nitively, that 1:1 is the ceiling due process 
requires in all of the States, and for all federal claims?” Given the 
earlier statements by the Court in State Farm v. Campbell, as well 
as the Court’s reliance in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker on statistical 
analyses of punitive damages that are not specifi c to maritime cases, 
there is considerable likelihood that the 1:1 ceiling ultimately will 
have ramifi cations beyond maritime cases.
In reaching the conclusion that a 1:1 ratio of punitive to compen-
satory damages is an appropriate upper bound, the Court relies on 
evidence from cases tried to verdict in which punitive damages had 
been awarded. The rationale for setting any specifi c value or range 
of values for the relationship between punitive awards and compen-
satory awards follows a rather baffl ing circular reasoning in that it 
questions the soundness of current punitive damages awards while 
at the same time using statistics drawn from these awards to set 
guidelines for future punitive damages awards.
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4 See id at 2618.
5 See id at 2617.
6 See id at 2621.
The Court’s argument for imposing additional structure is that 
predictable punitive damages awards are essential for establishing 
appropriate incentives: “Thus, a penalty should be reasonably pre-
dictable in its severity, so that even Justice Holmes’s ‘bad man’ can 
look ahead with some ability to know what the stakes are in choos-
ing one course of action or another.”4
The Court concludes that current punitive damages awards are 
not suffi ciently predictable, so additional guidelines are needed: 
“The real problem, it seems, is the stark unpredictability of punitive 
awards. Courts of law are concerned with fairness as consistency, and 
evidence that the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards 
falls within a reasonable zone, or that punitive awards are infrequent, 
fails to tell us whether the spread between high and low individual 
awards is acceptable. The available data suggests it is not.”5 The Court 
then adopts its 1:1 ratio of punitive damages awards to compensatory 
damages awards from the very behavior it claims is unpredictable.
Not only does the Court make use of observed punitive damages 
awards, it does so in a completely arbitrary fashion. The logic the 
Court relies on is that the median of the ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages is a reasonable benchmark; that the median 
ratio in studies cited is around 0.65:1; and therefore, a ratio of 1:1 is 
“a fair upper limit.”6 Yet, there are many other statistical reference 
points that could have been chosen, including those that also are 
based on an analysis of whether there were legitimate reasons for 
different ratios.
In this article, we analyze the statistical support for the Court’s 
decision and present new evidence relevant to the potential impli-
cations of the decision. First, we review law and economics theory 
demonstrating that while predictability of punitive damages awards 
is desirable, the ratio should depend on the probability of detection. 
The effi cient economic ratio could be greater than 1:1, less than 1:1, 
or some other value. Second, given the experimental evidence and 
the Court’s conclusion that punitive damages awards are unpredict-
able, the Court’s reliance on observed patterns of punitive damages 
to set guidelines for permissible punitive damages awards is highly 
questionable.
Our third concern is whether using the median ratio is a sensible 
approach. As the ratio consists of two positive numbers, ratio values 
can never be negative. For a truncated distribution of this type, one 
would expect the mean ratio to exceed the median so that a disparity 
between the mean and median values is not a signal of unpredictabil-
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7 Id at 2615.
8 See id.
9 The central role of the probability of detection in the law and economics approach 
dates back to Jeremy Bentham and is explored in detail in A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv L Rev 869-962 
(1998). The basic law and economics theory of the optimal deterrence value of puni-
tive damages can be recast in terms of the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory 
damages. Suppose that the probability of detection is q. Then, to provide effi cient 
incentives for the wrongdoer to exercise care, the condition for optimal damages levels 
is that
Compensatory Damages + Punitive Damages = Harm/ q,
which can be rewritten as
q × (Compensatory Damages + Punitive Damages) = Harm.
ity, but is a consequence of the inherent mathematical constraints 
on the distribution.
Fourth, we present a review of very large punitive damages awards 
and a detailed analysis of the data that form the primary empirical 
basis for the Court’s opinion, the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 
[hereinafter CJSSC]. While the sample of extremely large punitive 
damages awards provides evidence of highly variable ratios of puni-
tive damages to compensatory damages, the implications of the 
CJSSC data relied upon by the Court are less supportive of the Court’s 
argument. By analyzing the CJSSC data by case type and through a 
multiple regression analysis rather than focusing on overall averages, 
we are able to obtain a more accurate perspective than that offered 
by the Court. For the most part, there is a reasonable relationship 
between the mean and median ratio values. Only a small fraction 
of cases have awards in excess of the 1:1 ratio, and the main reason 
for these high ratios is that these cases have very low compensatory 
damages amounts.
I I .  T H E  E C O N O M I C  B A S I S  F O R  P U N I T I V E 
D A M A G E S  AWA R D S
In framing the punitive damages issue, the Court recognizes the 
different roles of compensatory damages and punitive damages, but 
provides no explicit theoretical basis for their relationship. In par-
ticular, the Court indicates that the function of punitive damages is 
restricted to retribution and deterrence rather than a compensatory 
function.7 With respect to deterrence, the Court also acknowledges 
the law and economics perspective that the punitive damages ratio 
could be higher for cases in which it is diffi cult to detect the wrong-
doing.8 The effi cient level of total damages from the standpoint of 
the economic theory of deterrence is the economic value of the harm 
divided by the probability of detection.9 Given that there is no chance 
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The expected penalty given by multiplying the probability of detection by the sum of 
compensatory and punitive damages will provide effi cient incentives for exercising 
care if that value equals the cost of the harm. If the harm is fully reimbursed by the 
value of compensatory damages so that Harm equals Compensatory Damages, then 
this condition can be rewritten as
Punitive Damages/ Compensatory Damages = (1/ q) – 1.
10 More generally, ascertaining the ex ante probability of detection may be diffi cult 
because the cases that go to court are the ones for which the wrongful conduct has 
been detected.
11 Exxon Shipping Co, 128 S Ct at 2621- 22.
of failing to detect a massive oil spill, the probability of detection for 
this case is 1.0.10 Had the Court restricted its approach to the stan-
dard law and economics reasoning with respect to detection, from 
the standpoint of deterrence the optimal punitive damages amount 
would have been zero. The Court also discusses other purposes of 
punitive damages, such as a retribution objective. Our intent here is 
not to offer an alternative theory of punitive damages, but to examine 
the legitimacy of the statistical basis for the Court’s decision.
The Court’s ultimate recommendation of a 1:1 ratio of punitive 
damages to compensatory damages for maritime cases stems from 
a desire to impose discipline on the setting of punitive damages by 
establishing an upper bound on the ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages. The Court selects its upper bound ratio of 
punitive damages to compensatory damages based on the median 
ratios reported in empirical studies. With empirical evidence across 
samples of cases indicating a median ratio less than 1:1, and often in 
a range such as 0.65:1, the Court concludes that a ratio of 1:1 in this 
case would be appropriate:
On these assumptions, a median ratio of punitive to compensa-
tory damages of about 0.65:1 probably marks the line near which 
cases like this one largely should be grouped. Accordingly, given 
the need to protect against the possibility (and the disruptive 
cost to the legal system) of awards that are unpredictable and 
unnecessary, either for deterrence or a measure of retribution, 
we consider that a 1:1 ratio, which is above the median award, 
is a fair upper limit in maritime cases.11
Whether the median is a useful guide and whether such a puni-
tive damages upper bound ratio will restrain damages is examined 
below.
To the extent that the Court recognizes the theoretical bases of 
punitive damages, it is with respect to exceptions from the recom-
mended 1:1 ratio. Specifi cally, the Court concludes:
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12 Id.
13 The Court notes that it chose not to rely on the studies reported in Cass R. 
Sunstein, et al, Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide (University of Chicago Press, 
2002): “Because this research was funded in part by Exxon, we decline to rely on it.” 
However, we note that the book was peer reviewed and also summarizes research that 
is published in peer- reviewed journals. In addition, many of the results with respect 
to punitive damages are simply variants of well established patterns of behavior that 
have been documented in a large literature in behavioral economics and psychology 
and are uncontroversial within these bodies of literature. Thus, in our opinion, the 
source of funding does not seem to warrant a wholesale rejection of a body of litera-
ture. See Exxon Shipping Co, 128 S Ct at 2626 n 17.
In a well- functioning system, we would expect that awards 
at the median or lower would roughly express jurors’ sense of 
reasonable penalties in cases with no earmarks of exceptional 
blameworthiness within the punishable spectrum (cases like 
this one, without intentional or malicious conduct, and with-
out behavior driven primarily by desire for gain, for example) 
and cases (again like this one) without the modest economic 
harm or odds of detection that have opened the door to higher 
awards.12
Factors such as a low probability of detection and intentional and 
malicious conduct may enter in justifying deviations from the 
1:1 guidelines, but are not themselves incorporated in setting this 
guideline. Moreover, how and to what extent these factors should be 
applied in deviating from the 1:1 ratio is never discussed.
I I I .  C U R R E N T  P U N I T I V E  D A M A G E S  AWA R D S 
A S  A  R E F E R E N C E  P O I N T
In its focus on the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory dam-
ages, the Court at least implicitly acts under the assumption that 
observed punitive damages awards provide some form of meaningful 
guidance. The Court does not address the issue of whether there is 
any rationale for relying on observed decisions for guidance in setting 
appropriate punitive damages amounts. In this section, we question 
the legitimacy of the Court’s approach. In the following discussion, 
we refer to juries as setting the award amounts because the major-
ity of punitive awards are outcomes of jury trials rather than bench 
trials.
The Court’s view that the problem with punitive awards is their 
“unpredictability” is consistent with recent experimental research 
on jury behavior reported in Sunstein et al.13 The Court does not offer 
guidance that would enable juries to approach the setting of punitive 
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14 Exxon Shipping Co, 128 S Ct at 2626 n 17.
15 A plaintiff attorney’s request for a specifi c damages amount can infl uence puni-
tive damages awards even when juries have explicit jury instructions that presum-
ably enable them to avoid anchoring effects. See Sunstein, et al, at 149- 58 (cited in 
note 13).
16 See id at 216- 19.
17 Thomas D. Wilson, et al, A New Look at Anchoring Effects: Basic Anchoring and 
Its Antecedents, 125 J Experimental Psychol Gen 387 (1996).
18 To the extent that the biases are systematic and not random, statistical examina-
tions of actual patterns of jury awards to assess their predictability, or lack thereof, are 
off point. If jury awards are always an order of magnitude too high because of anchoring 
effects, they will be predictable, but wrong.
damages in a way that embodies the functions of punitive damages. It 
implicitly accepts the current ratio distribution as having suffi cient 
meaning and focuses on the median value of awards of roughly 0.65:1 
as a useful reference point. The Court adds some additional leeway 
amount, presumably to capture case heterogeneity, so as to have a 1:1 
ratio as “a fair upper limit in such maritime cases.”14
A frequently observed shortcoming of jury behavior is that jurors 
often seek convenient, salient reference points, taking advantage of 
available anchors in setting the punitive damages award amount. 
These anchors could be provided by attorneys as part of their argu-
ments in the case or could come from jurors’ experiences.15 Based on 
their studies, Sunstein et al. conclude that jurors engage in a multi-
 stage anchor- and- adjust process where they fi rst receive the anchor 
amount, translate that anchor into an appropriate dollar award, bring 
to bear additional information about the case, and then adjust the 
award amount to arrive at their fi nal award value.16 The infl uence of 
anchor- and- adjustment processes as a crutch for handling complex 
decisions is a well- established phenomenon in the behavioral litera-
ture and is not restricted to punitive damages.17
Likewise, the Court apparently searched for an available anchor 
to resolve its complex task. The Court sought refuge in a salient sta-
tistical value—the median ratio in samples of observed cases. Much 
like the punitive damages anchors given to juries, the median statis-
tic looms as a reference point that could assist the Court in resolving 
an otherwise diffi cult task. Reliance on such anchors by either jurors 
or the Court refl ects the absence of a more systematic methodology 
for establishing the punitive damages value or the appropriate ratio 
of punitive damages to compensatory damages.
The broader implication of the experimental studies of punitive 
damages is that the task of setting punitive damages is fraught with 
potential errors and systematic biases.18 Examining any statistic 
from the current distribution of the ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages is only meaningful if the underlying juror 
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19 Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach 708 (2d 
ed, South- Western 2003).
20 Exxon Shipping Co, 128 S Ct at 2617.
behavior is sound. The Court fails to grapple with the fundamental 
inadequacies of the process for setting the award amounts and never 
motivates the rationale for establishing punitive damages guidelines 
using statistics drawn from current awards.
I V.  T H E  VA L I D I T Y  O F  T H E  C O U R T ’ S 
S TAT I S T I C A L  R E F E R E N C E  P O I N T
In this section, we discuss the Court’s use of the median as a statisti-
cal reference point and the suitability of the sample of cases that the 
Court relies upon in setting the punitive damages guideline. Given 
the properties of the distribution of ratios of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages, we suggest that the median is an overly con-
servative upper bound on the ratio. Furthermore, the studies cited 
by the Court are not based on the high stakes cases of the type that 
have been the subject of Supreme Court review and therefore may 
not provide the appropriate comparator group.
Both the median and the mean are measures of central tendency in 
a distribution. In terms of the ratios of interest here, for an odd num-
ber of cases, the median ratio will have an equal number of cases with 
ratios below the median ratio and above the median ratio. If there is 
an even number of cases, the median will be the average of the two 
ratios in the middle of the distribution. The mean ratio is the simple 
average of the ratios of punitive damages to compensatory damages 
across all cases. Thus, the mean is the sum of the ratios divided by the 
number of cases. The mean consequently takes into account the ratio 
values for the entire mix of cases, ranging across all types of conduct 
and harm values. In effect, the median selects a single case from the 
middle of the distribution as the guide.
Whether the median and mean are the same depends on the 
shape of the distribution. For symmetric distributions around the 
mean value, the mean and median will be identical.19 However, as 
the Court notes, for one analysis of data from the CJSSC, the mean 
ratio value is 2.90:1, which is much greater than the median value 
of 0.62:1. The Court concludes that this difference, along with the 
observed standard deviation of ratios of 13.81, is a sign that ratios are 
unpredictable.20
A difference between the mean and median coupled with a posi-
tive standard deviation does not imply that the ratios of punitive 
awards to compensatory awards are unpredictable. Suppose that 
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21 Id.
there are ten cases in each of three categories of recklessness. Cases 
with a low degree of recklessness have a ratio of 0.10, cases with a 
medium degree of recklessness have a ratio of 0.62, and cases with 
a high degree of recklessness have a ratio of 10. These cases have a 
median ratio of 0.62, a mean ratio of 3.57, and a standard deviation of 
4.63. While the ratios are clearly different, the outcomes are perfectly 
predictable conditional on the degree of recklessness in the case.
The Court also makes an unwarranted logical leap in concluding 
that variability in the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory 
damages implies that punitive damages award levels are unpredict-
able.21 Suppose that in every case the punitive damages award is 
$1,000. Even with perfectly predictable punitive damages levels, the 
ratios will exhibit variation because the denominator in the ratio— 
the value of compensatory damages— differs across cases.
The Court’s conclusion about unpredictability also ignores the 
quite legitimate reasons for why the mean might exceed the median 
given the constraints on the possible shapes of the distribution of 
ratios. It is not at all surprising or indicative of unpredictable awards 
that the mean ratio is greater than the median ratio. The distribution 
of possible ratios is truncated from below at zero so that one would 
expect a relatively longer upper tail of the distribution. A symmetric 
distribution requires similar massing of the observed ratios above 
and below the median. For the distribution to be symmetric around 
a median value of 0.62, the lowest observed ratio of zero would need 
to be coupled with the highest observed ratio of 1.24. Surely there are 
valid reasons that one might observe the ratio of punitive damages 
to compensatory damages above 1.24. More generally, one would ex-
pect there to be an asymmetry in the ratio distribution, given that the 
ratio values are constrained to be positive, so that the mean ratio will 
exceed the median ratio.
The Court’s focus on the median is presumably an attempt to limit 
the infl uence of extreme outliers. However, the fact that the median 
is below the mean does not necessarily signal the presence of outliers 
or the need to disregard mean ratio values that are more refl ective of 
the broader relationship between punitive damages and compensa-
tory damages. Other procedures, such as trimming the top 5% and 
bottom 5% of the distribution, can eliminate the infl uence of out-
liers at both ends of the distribution. By selecting the median rather 
than the mean as the key benchmark of interest, the Court adopts a 
highly constraining approach.
We now turn to the representativeness of the data relied upon by 
the Court. The Court considers the fi ndings of several studies in the 
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22 See Theodore Eisenberg, et al, Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empiri-
cal Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 
Data, 3 J Empirical Legal Stud 278 (2006); Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Thomas H. Cohen, Punitive Damage Awards in Large Counties, 2001 (2005). For an 
analysis of the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1996, not cited in the Court’s 
opinion, see Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries 
Perform 33 J Legal Stud 1, 1- 36 (2004).
23 See RAND Institute for Civil Justice, Deborah R. Hensler and Erik Moller, Trends 
in Punitive Damages: Preliminary Data from Cook County, Illinois, and San Fran-
cisco, California (1995); RAND Institute for Civil Justice, Mark A. Peterson, Syam 
Sarma, and Michael G. Shanley, Punitive Damages: Empirical Findings (1987).
24 See Neil Vidmar and Mary R. Rose, Punitive Damages by Juries in Florida: In 
Terrorem and in Reality, 38 Harv J Legis, 487, 487- 513 (2001). For details see Exxon 
Shipping Co, 128 S Ct at 2625 n 13.
25 See Erik Moller, Nicholas M. Pace, and Stephen J. Carroll, Punitive Damages in 
Financial Injury Jury Verdicts, 28 J Legal Stud 307 (1999).
26 The discussion below is based on the U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, Inter- university Consortium for Political and Social Research, Civil Justice 
Survey of State Courts, 2001: United States, (1st ICPSR ed, 2004).
27 A fourth wave of data was made publicly available after this article was com-
pleted. The sampling frame is a two- stage stratifi ed sampling process. In the fi rst stage, 
the 75 most populous counties were identifi ed. In the second stage, 45 of these coun-
ties were selected for inclusion in the study. Within the set of counties selected for 
literature. The broadest data source used in the cited studies is the 
CJSSC, with data from 1992, 1996, and 2001.22 The Court focuses 
primarily on studies based on these data. The second set of studies 
uses data from cases in particular regions of the country, including 
San Francisco and Cook Counties from the early 1980s through the 
early 1990s,23 and Florida state courts from 1989 to 1998.24 The third 
set of studies uses data from fi nancial injury cases in six states and in 
Cook County.25 The median ratios of punitive damages to compen-
satory damages in these studies ranged from 0.62:1 to 0.67:1, with 
the exception of a ratio of 1.4:1 for a fi nancial harm sample. Because 
the Court focuses primarily on the implications of the CJSSC data 
in arriving at its decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, our cur-
rent discussion focuses on these data, although the implications are 
general. In the following section, we also provide a new analysis of 
these data.
A brief overview of the data collection procedure used for the 
CJSSC is useful.26 The CJSSC is a sample of tort, contract, and real 
property cases tried to verdict in selected counties in state courts. 
Thus, cases that settle, cases tried in state courts but in counties 
not in the sampling frame, and cases tried in federal courts are not 
represented. There are currently three waves of data that are publicly 
available, with samples of cases completed in 1992 (jury only), and in 
1996 and 2001 (both jury and bench trials).27
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inclusion in the study, cases that met certain criteria were included in the data set. The 
survey included all trials in the county if there were fewer than 300 total trials or 300 
jury trials in the county. If there were more than 300 cases, a random sample of 275 
cases of each trial type were included in the sample, as well as all medical malpractice 
or products liability cases.
28 Procedures for constructing this comprehensive inventory of all large punitive 
damages awards are described in Hersch & Viscusi, 33 J Legal Stud 1 (cited in note 22), 
and in W. Kip Viscusi, The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 53 Emory L J 1405 
(2004). These articles report the list of all blockbuster cases through 2003. The same 
procedures used in constructing the earlier punitive damages compilation have been 
followed to include all cases through 2007. This expanded set of cases forms the basis 
for the current discussion.
29 The original punitive damages verdicts are $145 million in the State Farm case 
and $5 billion in the Exxon case. Earlier U.S. Supreme Court decisions address smaller 
punitive damages awards, which nevertheless would be at the very high end of the 
state court sample distribution. The punitive damages award in BMW of N Am, Inc 
v Gore, 517 US 559 (1996) is $4 million, while the punitive damages award in Cooper 
Industries, Inc v Leatherman Tool Group, Inc, 532 US 424 (2001) is $2 million.
While the CJSSC database is a representative sample given the 
sampling frame, we now discuss whether evidence from this data set 
provides appropriate guidance for large stakes cases. As we discuss, 
the majority of the verdicts in this data set result in small punitive 
awards and small ratios. In contrast, the two cases that led to the 
Court’s recent guidance with respect to the ratio of punitive awards 
to compensatory awards involve far higher stakes than all but one 
case in the CJSSC database.
An alternative data source is the sample of cases with punitive 
damages awards of at least $100 million, which we refer to as the 
‘blockbuster’ sample.28 As of 2007, there have been 93 awards that 
merit the blockbuster designation. These awards of at least $100 mil-
lion are often among the most prominent cases and include the State 
Farm and Exxon Shipping Co. punitive damages awards that are the 
focus of the two most recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions pertain-
ing to punitive damages.29 In addition, the economic stakes involved 
are quite substantial and are more similar to the large stakes cases 
that merit U.S. Supreme Court review.
To what extent is the CJSSC dataset refl ective of these large puni-
tive damages awards? In all, eighteen blockbuster awards were in fed-
eral courts—19 percent of the total number of blockbuster awards, 
including the 1994 Exxon Valdez oil spill award in In re the Exxon 
Valdez— the case that gave rise to the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker. Within the state courts, the CJSSC 
sample includes counties in 22 states, so more than half of the states 
are not eligible for inclusion in the sample. Among the omitted states 
are Alaska, the site of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and Mississippi 
and Alabama, two states widely reputed to be favorable venues for 
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30 See Amalia Deligiannis, Madison County: A Corporation’s Worst Nightmare, 
14 Corp Legal Times 52 (2004); American Tort Reform Association, Bringing Justice 
to Judicial Hellholes 2003 3 (2003), online at http:// www .atra .org/ reports/ hellholes/ 
report .pdf; see also Sue Reisinger, Shell Oil’s Hefty Settlement: A Harbinger for MTBE 
Defendants, 12 Corp Legal Times 54 (2002) (all providing examples of Madison Coun-
ty’s reputation).
31 The two Madison County awards were $3.1 billion in Price v Philip Morris, Inc, 
341 Ill App 3d 941 (2003) and a $200 million award in Whittington v US Steel, 2003 WL 
24057769. The Cook County award was a $124.57 million punitive damages award in 
Proctor v Davis and Upjohn Co, 291 Ill App 3d 265 (1997).
punitive damages. The BMW v. Gore case that is the subject of an 
earlier U.S. Supreme Court decision on punitive damages involves 
an Alabama damages claim.
For many states, only the single most populous county is included. 
Thus, for Illinois, Cook County is in the data set, while the highly 
controversial downstate venue of Madison County is not.30 Two of 
the blockbuster awards are in Madison County, as compared to only 
one in the more populous Cook County.31 In terms of the number of 
blockbuster awards omitted, the incomplete county coverage of the 
CJSSC data set is more important than the state omission, as 25 of 
the 67 awards are in counties for which the state is in the sample, but 
the county is not.
Had the Court used the blockbuster cases as the reference point, it 
would have reached a quite different assessment of the ratio of puni-
tive damages to compensatory damages. Excluding a case for which 
the ratio is not defi ned because the compensatory damages value is 
zero, the blockbuster awards ratio distribution has a median value of 
8.85, or more than 10 times greater than the median value of 0.65:1 
focused on by the Court. The blockbuster case ratios are highly vari-
able, with a mean of 757.97 and a standard deviation of 4629.97, 
which is consistent with the Court’s concerns with variability. How-
ever, if the solution to variability is to draw on the implications of 
the median ratio, then a median based on high stakes cases may be 
more pertinent than the median for a mix of cases that often includes 
small punitive damages awards, as we document below. Using a high 
stakes case median ratio would lead to a greater permissible level of 
punitive damages.
V.  VA R I AT I O N  I N  P U N I T I V E  D A M A G E S 
R AT I O S
The decision in Exxon Shipping Co. recognizes that there is vari-
ability in punitive damages awards. The discussions of the ratios’ 
mean- median spread and the standard deviation of award ratios were 
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32 Exxon Shipping Co, 128 S Ct at 2621- 22.
33 The specifi c weighting variables we use are ‘wght’ for 1992; ‘wgt2’ for 1996; and 
‘wght75’ for 2001.
34 The unweighted median ratio is 0.62:1, the same as that reported in Eisenberg, 
et al, 3 J Empirical Legal Stud 278 (cited in note 22), and cited by the Court. See Exxon 
Shipping Co, 128 S Ct at 2617.
35 Our unweighted mean value of the ratio is 14.16:1. The Court cites unweighted 
values.
two such references to statistical variability. However, the punitive 
damages awards also might differ for sound substantive reasons. As 
the Court recognizes, there is a rationale for a higher ratio when there 
is exceptional blameworthiness, small economic damages, or a low 
probability of detection.32 In this section, we examine the heteroge-
neity of punitive damages ratios to explore these and other concerns 
to the extent that the CJSSC data permit. In particular, we analyze 
three issues: i) whether many punitive damages awards are trivial 
so that inclusion of these awards generates a lower median value, 
ii) whether large ratios of punitive damages to compensatory dam-
ages are likely to arise when the value of compensatory damages is 
low, and iii) whether punitive damages vary by case type to refl ect 
the blameworthiness of behavior and other factors that the Court 
recognizes as legitimate sources of departure from the recommended 
1:1 ratio.
In doing so, we examine statistics based on the CJSSC for 1992, 
1996, and 2001, which is the focus of much of the Court’s discus-
sion. For those three years, there are 517 cases in which the plaintiff 
won and was awarded both positive punitive damages and positive 
compensatory damages. We refer to this set of 517 cases as the “puni-
tive damages sample.” All values reported in the text and Tables 1 
and 2 are weighted by the sample weight provided for each year.33 
We convert all punitive damages values to 2001 dollars so that data 
from the three survey years are comparable. We fi nd a median ratio of 
punitive damages to compensatory damages of 0.66:1 after weighting 
the observations by the sampling weights.34 However, our calculated 
mean ratio is 22.1:1, or almost an order of magnitude greater than the 
mean value of 2.90 cited by the court.35
The fi rst matter of interest is whether many punitive damages 
awards are very small and whether inclusion of these awards in the 
sample reference points used by the Court distorts the median ratio 
of punitive damages to compensatory damages. Imposing a $1,000 
minimum threshold on punitive damages awards reduces the num-
ber of cases with punitive damages awards from 517 to 491 and raises 
the median ratio from 0.66 to 0.75. If a minimum punitive damages 
award of $10,000 is imposed, the number of cases is 388, and the ratio 
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increases to 0.89. Increasing the minimum punitive damages award 
to $100,000 reduces the number of cases to 199 and boosts the ratio 
to 1.15. Consequently, even a punitive damages cutoff well below 
the magnitude of any punitive damages awards in recent Supreme 
Court decisions leads to a ratio of at least 1.15, which is above the 
Court’s guideline in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker. The Court’s deci-
sion to use all cases as a reference point rather than considering only 
the large punitive damages cases alters the distribution in a manner 
that generates a lower median ratio. These concerns also call into 
question the appropriateness of relying on the median ratio for all 
awards as a guideline.
The second issue pertains to the Court’s acknowledgement that 
a very low level of compensatory damages could be a rationale for 
a high ratio. This relationship is in fact borne out. For example, the 
thirteen cases with a compensatory damages value below $1,000 
have a median ratio of 25.67 and a mean ratio of 613.61. The highest 
ratio in the CJSSC sample is 5,000:1, which is an automobile tort case 
in which compensatory damages are $1 and punitive damages are 
$5,000. Given the minimal value of compensatory damages in this 
case, such a ratio might well be in line with the Court’s willingness 
to accept higher ratios when compensatory damages are very small. 
Thus, the presence of some so-called ratio outliers in the observed 
distribution may stem from a very low level of compensatory dam-
ages rather than an implausibly large ratio.
The third issue is whether there might be additional case- specifi c 
justifi cations for a large ratio. Analyzing the entire distribution of 
ratios by different case type illuminates this issue and reinforces the 
earlier concern that inclusion of small stakes cases may distort the 
award distribution in a manner that makes the median a meaningless 
guide. Table 1 presents the mean of the ratios and the percentile dis-
tribution for different case types for the punitive damages sample.36 
This breakdown makes it possible to examine different portions of 
the ratio distribution as well as whether the case types differ in terms 
of their ratio. That there is such a distribution and that it varies by 
case type highlights two aspects of the Court’s statistical approach: 
i) the Court selected the median as the reference point despite the 
existence of many other percentiles in the distribution that might be 
pertinent, and ii) it did not incorporate differences across case types, 
36 The common set of case types that are reported by the CJSSC for all three years 
are the following: motor vehicle tort, premises liability, products liability, intentional 
tort, medical malpractice, professional malpractice, slander/ libel, other tort, fraud, 
seller plaintiff, buyer plaintiff, employment contract, lease, other contract, other prop-
erty. Mortgage and eminent domain are also recorded, but no cases of these types have 
punitive damages awards within the sample.
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even though the differences in the distributions among case types are 
often substantial.
Examination by case type indicates that the mean of the ratio of 
punitive damages to compensatory damages is low for most case 
types. There is much less variability than is implied by the Court. 
The mean ratios are below 2:1 for nine of the fi fteen case types. The 
main factors driving the overall spread between mean and median 
ratios are concentrated in a few types of cases. Motor vehicle tort 
cases have the highest mean ratio, where this effect is driven by a 
small group of cases at the upper end of the distribution, such as 
the $1 compensatory damages award case discussed above. Products 
liability cases and intentional torts are the only other case types with 
double- digit or greater mean ratios, where this pattern once again 
can be traced to a small group of cases. There are only seven products 
liability cases in the data set, and the products liability case with 
the highest ratio has a small compensatory damages award of $2,062 
Table 1. Distribution of Ratio of Punitive Damages to Compensatory Damages by 
Case Type
Percentile
Case Type  N  Mean  5  25  50  75  95
All case types 517 22.1 0.03 0.23 0.66 1.70 13.16
Motor vehicle tort 60 135.5 0.01 0.17 0.48 1.12 7.73
Premises liability 25 2.3 0.09 0.41 1.45 1.63 6.11
Products liability 7 27.5 0.22 0.51 0.63 1.53 258.27
Intentional tort 90 21.5 0.06 0.30 0.71 1.95 68.97
Medical malpractice 11 1.1 0.09 0.09 0.54 1.00 9.08
Professional malpractice 12 1.3 0.00 0.17 0.68 2.02 4.63
Slander/ libel 17 3.6 0.03 0.37 0.76 3.81 18.00
Other tort 37 5.2 0.08 0.29 1.29 4.41 25.67
Fraud 77 1.7 0.05 0.25 0.66 1.21 5.50
Seller plaintiff 23 1.2 0.01 0.10 0.23 1.08 6.96
Buyer plaintiff 51 1.7 0.05 0.19 0.56 1.73 10.00
Employment contract 63 1.6 0.07 0.33 0.64 1.83 7.55
Lease 11 0.8 0.01 0.42 0.83 1.25 2.06
Other contract 25 1.9 0.05 0.29 0.95 4.05 5.38
Other property  6  0.8 0.08 0.08 0.43 1.19  2.60
Data source: Authors’ calculations based on the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 
for the years 1992, 1996, and 2001. The sample is comprised of 517 cases where the 
plaintiff won and compensatory and punitive damages were awarded. All values are 
weighted by sample weight provided for the data year. Case type is not reported for 
two cases from 1996. Note that the 5th percentile and the 25th percentile for medical 
malpractice are both 0.09.
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coupled with a punitive damages award of $532,618. It also appears 
to be quite reasonable for the intentional tort cases to have a higher 
ratio, which would be consistent with the Court’s guidance with 
respect to the types of conduct that might merit deviations from the 
1:1 ratio level.
The median ratios for the different case types reported in Table 1 
are often very different from the median ratio across all case types of 
0.66:1. The median ratio ranges from 0.23 to 1.45. To the extent that 
the median is a reliable guide, a recommended ratio of 1:1 may be 
too high for some case types and too low for others. A recommended 
upper bound of 1:1 consequently would be a binding constraint at the 
median for two of the case types—premises liability cases and the 
‘other’ tort category of cases.
The results at the lower percentiles reinforce the earlier observa-
tion about some punitive damages awards being quite small. The 5th 
percentile and 25th percentile results are quite striking in terms of 
how low their values are. At the 5th percentile, the ratio is only 0.03 
over all cases, indicating that in many instances the punitive dam-
ages awards are only token amounts. Even at the 25th percentile, the 
ratios are very small. A case type to note particularly is medical mal-
practice. Despite being the focus of much tort reform discussion, the 
ratio at the 25th percentile for medical malpractice awards is only 
0.09. Ratios of this magnitude, and even the 25th percentile across 
all cases of 0.23, suggest that the punitive damages awards for these 
low ratio cases may have been symbolic amounts that are unlikely 
to create fi nancial incentives that would alter behavior greatly or 
punish the defendant to a signifi cant degree.
Suppose that these awards at the very low end of the ratio distribu-
tion are either not intended to serve the genuine purpose of punitive 
damages or are the result of an inability of jurors to set meaningful 
punitive damages amounts. Including them in the distribution of 
awards rather than dismissing them as being not pertinent lowers 
the observed median ratio value for the cases.
Matters become more complex at the upper end of the distribu-
tion. The ratio at the 95th percentile over all cases is 13.16, with 
each of the case types having a ratio of at least 1:1. Several case types 
have double- digit ratios at the 95th percentile that would be above 
the single- digit upper bound in the State Farm case: 68.97 for inten-
tional torts, 18.00 for slander/ libel, 25.67 for the other tort category, 
and 10.00 for buyer plaintiff. To the extent that these case types 
involve the type of blameworthy behavior that the Court views as 
possibly meriting ratios in excess of 1:1, these cases may have a le-
gitimate basis for a larger ratio, so presumably a cap of 1:1 would not 
be imposed in all these cases.
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37 The regressions include all 517 punitive damages awards. Excluding the motor 
vehicle tort case with a ratio of 5,000 and a log ratio value of 8.52 has a modest effect on 
the coeffi cients and does not alter the overall relationships. Comparable regressions in 
which the dependent variable is the ratio rather than the log of the ratio explain very 
little of the variation.
38 Unless noted otherwise, all effects discussed below are statistically signifi cant at 
the 10 percent level or higher. Table 2 reports coeffi cients and standard errors, as well 
as indicators for signifi cance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels.
A multiple regression analysis of the determinants of the ratio 
of punitive damages to compensatory damages illuminates which 
aspects of the cases are most infl uential in determining the ratio 
levels. Table 2 presents two regressions relating the log value of 
the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages to the log 
value of compensatory damages and the square of this term.37 This 
compensatory damages formulation that includes a quadratic term 
makes possible an exploration of potential nonlinearities in the rela-
tionship between the punitive damages to compensatory damages 
ratio and compensatory damages. Year indicator variables are also 
included in the regressions. The fi rst column in Table 2 reports the 
results of a regression controlling only for the compensatory damages 
variables and for year. The second equation in Table 2 adds to the 
basic equation a comprehensive set of case characteristics that are 
available in all three years of data. The additional variables included 
in this equation are the total number of plaintiffs, the total num-
ber of defendants, and a series of indicator variables for jury trial, 
litigant pairs (individual v. individual, individual v. non- individual, 
non- individual v. individual, with non- individual v. non- individual 
the omitted category), each of the case types listed in Table 1 (with 
motor vehicle tort the omitted category), bodily injury, and the 10 
counties with a large number of cases.
Both equations indicate a signifi cant negative effect of the log 
compensatory damages amount coupled with a signifi cant positive 
squared effect.38 There is no signifi cant temporal trend in the ratio 
controlling for compensatory damages amounts. The ramifi cations 
of these estimates for the relationship between the ratio of punitive 
damages to compensatory damages and compensatory damages are 
illustrated in Figure 1. Using the basic regression reported in column 
1 of Table 2, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages 
starts at a high value for cases with low levels of compensatory dam-
ages. The ratio declines as compensatory damages amounts rise. At 
a compensatory damages value of $8,100, the log of the ratio drops 
below 0, which in turn implies that the ratio is below 1.0. For the 
very low compensatory awards below this amount, the predicted 
ratio is above 1.0. The log of the ratio reaches its minimum value 
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Table 2. Regression of Log(Punitive Damages/ Compensatory Damages) on Case 
Characteristics
  (1)  (2)
Log compensatory damages – 1.349** – 1.303**
(0.154) (0.156)
Log compensatory damages squared 0.048** 0.045**
(0.007) (0.007)
Total number of plaintiffs 0.147**
(0.053)
Total number of defendants 0.008
(0.033)
Jury trial – 0.242
(0.240)
Individual v. individual 0.150
(0.312)
Individual v. non- individual 0.533+
(0.281)
Non- individual v. individual – 0.448
(0.510)
Premises liability 0.462
(0.418)
Products liability 1.281
(0.798)
Intentional tort 0.546+
(0.308)
Medical malpractice 0.318
(0.539)
Professional malpractice – 0.512
(0.619)
Slander/ libel 0.717
(0.591)
Other tort 0.935*
(0.415)
Fraud 0.484
(0.457)
Seller plaintiff – 0.063
(0.533)
Buyer plaintiff 0.385
(0.468)
Employment contract 0.844+
(0.470)
Lease 0.136
(0.678)
Other contract 1.193*
(0.582)
Other property 0.195
(0.792)
Bodily injury – 0.005
(0.324)
Year = 1992 0.300 0.215
(0.194) (0.217)
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39 A test of the joint signifi cance of the additional variables included in the regres-
sion reported in column 2 but not column 1 yields F= 1.65, p=0.015. Thus, the addi-
tional variables are jointly signifi cant at the 5 percent level but not at the 1 percent 
level.
40 Specifi cally, the largest pairwise correlation with the log of compensatory dam-
ages and the additional variables is with intentional tort, with a correlation coeffi cient 
of – 0.176.
for a compensatory damages level of $1.28 million. The subsequent 
upward trend in the ratio affects few cases, as less than 10 percent of 
the sample of punitive awards have compensatory damages values 
of at least $1.28 million. Only for a compensatory damages amount 
of at least $218 million does the log of the ratio become positive. No 
cases in the sample are in the range where the predicted log of the 
ratio returns to being positive.
The results in Table 2 have a second principal implication. Most 
of the variation is accounted for by the compensatory damages vari-
ables. The adjusted R-squared value increases from 0.20 to only 0.24 
after the inclusion of a very extensive set of case characteristic vari-
ables.39 Furthermore, the coeffi cients on the compensatory damages 
variables are very similar in the two regressions, which is consistent 
with the generally low individual correlation between compensatory 
damages and the additional variables calculated for this sample.40
In terms of predicting the level of the ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages, the dominant factor is the relationship that 
is established between punitive damages and compensatory dam-
ages. Other possibly pertinent infl uences such as the locale, the type 
Table 2. Regression of Log(Punitive Damages/ Compensatory Damages) on Case 
Characteristics (continued)
  (1)  (2)
Year = 1996 0.057 – 0.300
(0.209) (0.231)
Constant 8.181** 7.434**
(0.854) (0.973)
Adjusted R-squared  0.20  0.24
Data source: Authors’ calculations based on the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 
for the years 1992, 1996, and 2001. The sample is comprised of 517 cases where the 
plaintiff won and compensatory and punitive damages were awarded. All values are 
weighted by sample weight provided for the data year. The omitted categories are: 
motor vehicle tort and non- individual v. non- individual litigant pair. Indicator vari-
ables for 10 counties and indicator variables for missing values of number of plaintiffs 
or defendants and for litigant pair are included in the regression, but these coeffi cients 
are not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. + signifi cant at 10%; * signifi cant at 
5%; ** signifi cant at 1%.
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of case, the characteristics of the parties involved, and whether the 
case involved bodily injury, have a small independent effect on the 
ratio. Examination of the results in the second column of Table 2 
indicates which case characteristics have a signifi cant infl uence. The 
number of plaintiffs in the case has a positive and signifi cant effect 
on the ratio. In addition, a litigant pair that involves an individual 
fi ling a claim against a non- individual has a positive effect that is 
signifi cant relative to the omitted category of non- individual v. non-
 individual litigant pairs.
Relative to the omitted category of motor vehicle tort, several of 
the case types have a positive effect on the ratio of punitive damages 
to compensatory damages. These include: products liability (margin-
ally signifi cant p = 0.109), intentional tort, other tort, employment 
contract, and other contract. The effects for the fi rst three tort groups 
are consistent with the overall statistics reported in Table 1, which 
indicate high ratios at the 95th percentile of these groupings. Bodily 
injury cases do not have a signifi cant effect on the ratio. The high 
ratio for intentional torts is in line with the exceptions noted by the 
Court, but the reasons for all the other case type effects cannot be 
determined in the absence of information that describes the charac-
Figure 1. The Relationship between Predicted Log(Punitive Damages/ 
Compensatory Damages) and Log(Compensatory Damages)
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teristics of the case more completely, such as a discrepancy between 
the harm and the level of compensatory damages.
The ultimate effect of Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker on punitive 
damages will depend on the extent to which the Court’s guidance 
serves as a ceiling rather than as an anchor. In the punitive damages 
sample from the CJSSC data, there are 187 cases with ratios above 1:1. 
If these cases had ratios of 1:1, the average punitive damages award 
of $6,332,246 would be reduced to $2,023,431. The gross reduction 
in punitive damages from imposing an upper bound on these cases 
would be $805.7 million. For the thirteen cases for which the ratio is 
already 1:1, the average punitive damages award of $117,529 would 
be unaffected. The 317 cases with ratios below 1:1 would increase 
their punitive damages award from $298,179 to $871,911 if the 1:1 
ratio serves as a target anchor. There are consequently more cases 
that would experience an increase in punitive damages awards than 
a decrease if a 1:1 ratio became the norm. However, because of the 
skewed distribution of award values, the savings from capping large 
awards exceed the increased costs of $181.9 million from boosting 
award levels. The net savings from having a 1:1 target for these cases 
is consequently $623.8 million, or about one- fourth less than the 
gross savings.
V I .  C O N C L U S I O N
In their quest to address the perceived problem of unpredictability of 
punitive damages, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a mathematical 
approach. The main matter of interest for the Court is not the level 
of punitive damages, but rather is the ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages in the case. That there should be concern 
with the relationship between these two damages components is not 
unreasonable, and is in fact embodied in standard law and economics 
theory of punitive damages. From the standpoint of perceived fair-
ness, the idea that punitive damages for retributive purposes should 
bear some relationship to the harm, which usually is refl ected in the 
compensatory damages amount, is quite appealing and is embodied 
in legal rules such as those pertaining to treble damages.
Ultimately, the decision relies on available statistical evidence as 
the justifi cation of the approach. Why current awards provide any 
reliable basis for setting punitive damages guidelines is never justi-
fi ed by the Court and is inconsistent with the view of the Court and 
the academic literature suggesting that jury behavior is unpredict-
able. Because the median ratio is about 0.65 in some studies, chiefl y 
drawing on samples of state court cases, the Court views a 1:1 ratio as 
a fair upper limit. However, the underlying statistical support for 
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using the 1:1 ratio as a guideline is not compelling. While the median 
ratio is one statistic, there are other values, such as different percen-
tiles of the distribution or the mean, that are also statistical measures 
of aspects of the distribution of punitive damages to compensatory 
damages ratios. Moreover, the median of this ratio will tend to be 
smaller than the mean value even if punitive damages levels are set 
appropriately because the distribution of the ratio of punitive dam-
ages to compensatory damages is truncated from below.
Somewhat curiously, the Court placed greatest reliance on the 
median ratio in the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts data. How-
ever, detailed examination of these data indicates that the high ratios 
of punitive damages to compensatory damages are due primarily to 
cases with very small compensatory awards, which are the types of 
cases that the Exxon guidelines might exempt. Cases with larger 
stakes in excess of $8,100 in compensatory awards have average pre-
dicted ratios below 1.0 for every case in the CJSSC sample. A sub-
stantial fraction of the punitive damages awards in the CJSSC sample 
involve token amounts that surely were only of symbolic value. If 
the Court wishes to rely on empirical evidence pertaining to highly 
variable and substantial punitive damages awards, a better reference 
point might be the sample of blockbuster punitive damages awards 
of at least $100 million. That sample has highly variable ratios of 
punitive damages to compensatory damages, but also has median 
ratio values in excess of 1.0. If these blockbuster cases are true outli-
ers that are the result of faulty punitive damages judgments, then 
they do not serve as a sensible reference point. However, if the large 
awards and the high ratios have a sound basis, then the factors that 
led to such awards should be examined more fully before dismissing 
their ratio in excess of 1.0 as being inappropriate.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to establish a numerical ratio 
guideline will have complex effects on future cases. In effect, this 
decision may establish the 1:1 ratio as a focal point or as an anchor 
for future jury deliberations. To the extent that the 1:1 ratio serves 
as both a ceiling and a fl oor for punitive damages, more cases will 
experience an increase in punitive damages levels than will experi-
ence a decrease. On balance, the total punitive damages values in the 
economy will be reduced because the large awards will be reduced by 
a greater amount than the small awards will be increased. However, 
the absence of a stronger theory of punitive damages to provide guid-
ance for setting punitive damages amounts will tend to reduce the 
restraining effect that the Court intends and will tend to homogenize 
punitive damages values, possibly limiting their deterrent effect and 
case- specifi c relevance.
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